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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellants (hereinafter "Fitzgeralds") filed this lawsuit 
based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violation of various consti-
tutional rights by the appellees (hereinafter "Utah County") 
relating to the Fitzgeralds' ownership interest in approximately 
27,000 acres of land in an area known as "Cedar Valley," located 
in Utah County, Utah. In addition, the Fitzgeralds sought to 
invoke the District Court's pendent jurisdiction over claims for 
malicious prosection and defamation of the Fitzgeralds' business 
and personal reputations. 
The essence of the Fitzgeralds' Complaint was that implemen-
tation and interpretation of certain zoning ordinances by offi-
cials of Utah County, pursuant to authority granted by enabling 
legislation of the State of Utah, was improper. The Fitzgeralds 
allege that Utah County officials imposed unreasonable condi-
tions on the acquisition of waivers from subdivision plat filing 
requirements by requiring the recording of restrictive covenants 
limiting the use of land to agricultural purposes, as required by 
Utah County ordinances. As a result of these decisions and 
actions by Utah County officials, the Fitzgeralds contend they 
have been deprived of constitutional rights to the unfettered 
acquisition, enjoyment and alienation of property. 
The Fitzgeralds asked the District Court to find that the 
Utah County ordinances were facially unconstitutional and had 
been applied in an unconstitutional manner against them. The 
Fitzgeralds also requested that the District Court find that Utah 
County's enforcement of the ordinances constituted a taking of 
property without just compensation and that the Fitzgeralds had 
suffered defamation plus other constitutional injury. 
Utah County moved for summary judgment on all claims. On 
September 7, 1988, the District Court granted Summary Judgment on 
all issues except the "defamation plus damage to an interest in 
property" cause of action. The District Court ordered the 
Fitzgeralds to submit additional briefing on this issue and also 
ordered Utah County to submit a responsive memorandum. After 
receipt of those supplemental memoranda, the District Court, on 
July 25, 1989, granted Summary Judgment on the defamation plus 
issue and Judgment dismissing all of appellants1 claims was 
entered on August 21, 1989. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The Fitzgeralds had an ownership interest in approxi-
mately 27,000 acres of land in an area known as Cedar Valley, 
Utah County, Utah. (Document 63 at 3). 
2. The subject property is unincorporated. (Document 63 
at 4) . 
3. Appellee Utah County is a political subdivision organ-
ized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of 
Utah. (Document 63 at 4). 
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4. Appellee Jeff Mendenhall is now employed as the 
Planning Director of Utah County and has been so employed since 
April, 1978. (Document 63 at 4). 
5. Appellee Gordon Buckley Rose is currently employed as a 
Planner by Utah County and has been an employee of Utah County at 
all times mentioned in appellants' Complaint. (Document 63 at 
4). 
6. Appellee Iva Snell was employed by Utah County at all 
times mentioned in appellants' Complaint, but has since retired. 
(Document 63 at 4). 
7. Appellee Keith Richan, previously named as defendant 
John Doe 1 in appellants' designation of John Does, was formerly 
a member of the Board of County Commissioners of Utah County. He 
was previously the Chairman of the Utah County Planning 
Commission. (Document 63 at 4 and Document 80, Exhibit B at 6). 
8. Appellee Jeril Wilson, previously named as defendant 
John Doe 2 in appellants' designation of John Does, was formerly 
a member of the Board of County Commissioners of Utah County. 
(Document 6 3 at 4). 
9. Appellee Lynn W. Davis, previously named as John Doe 3 
in appellants' designation of John Does, was a Deputy Utah County 
Attorney. In May, 1987 he was appointed as a Judge in the Eighth 
Circuit Court for the State of Utah. (Document 63 at 5). 
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10. On or about December 22, 1976, Utah County passed the 
1976 Revised Zoning Ordinance of Utah County, Utah. (Document 63 
at 5) . 
11. The Ordinances contained provisions requiring the 
filing of a plat for the subdivision of land, § 4-3-52, and 
allowed for an exemption from the subdivision plat filing re-
quirement upon satisfactory completion of covenants precluding 
the residential or non-agricultural use of such land until an 
approved subdivision plat had been recorded, § 4-3-53. (Document 
63 at 5). 
12. The Fitzgeralds purchased approximately 9,000 acres in 
Cedar Valley on May 18, 1978 from Wallace Ohran who had purchased 
the property from the Cooperative Security Corporation; this 
acreage is known as the Monte Vista parcel. The Fitzgeralds1 
family purchased stock in the Monte Vista Ranch Corporation and 
appellants personally own 24% of the stock. (Deposition of 
Leland A. Fitzgerald, May 14, 1987, pages 7-8; Document 63 at 6). 
13. The Fitzgeralds purchased approximately 12,940 acres on 
January 31, 1977; this acreage is known as the McKinney parcel. 
The Fitzgeralds intended to ranch a portion of the land and sell 
part of it. (Deposition of Leland A. Fitzgerald, May 14, 1987, 
page 50; Document 63 at 6). 
14. The Fitzgeralds purchased approximately 5,000 acres by 
contract from James Dupratt in September, 1977; this acreage is 
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known as the Dupratt parcel. (Deposition of Leland A. 
Fitzgerald, May 14, 1987, page 89; Document 63 at 6). 
15. The Fitzgeralds purchased 920 acres from Eldred Nichols 
on March 19, 1979; this acreage is known as the Nichols parcel. 
(Deposition of Leland A. Fitzgerald, May 14, 1987, pages 100-
101; Document 63 at 6). 
16. The Fitzgeralds purchased approximately 53 acres from 
Robert Stewart on October 11, 1978; this acreage is known as the 
Stewart parcel. (Deposition of Leland A. Fitzgerald, May 14, 
1987, page 105; Document 63 at 7). 
17. Appellee Buckley Rose reviewed recorded real estate 
transactions in Cedar Valley at the direction of the Utah County 
Commission. (Affidavit of Gordon Buckley Rose; Document 63 at 
7)-
18. The subject parcels lie partially or entirely within 
the following designated zones: Mining and Grazing 1 (M & G-l), 
Rural Residential 5 (RR-5) and Agricultural 1 (A-l). (Document 
63 at 7). 
19. The appellants never appeared before or petitioned for 
an appearance before the Utah County Board of Adjustment. 
(Deposition of Leland A. Fitzgerald, May 14, 1987, page 128; 
Document 63 at 7). 
20. No application for subdivision plat approval for the 
subject property was ever submitted to Utah County by the 
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Fitzgeralds or filed with the Utah County Recorder. (Document 63 
at 7) . 
21. Many of the facts stated by the Fitzgeralds are based 
exclusively on conclusory affidavits signed by appellant Leland 
Fitzgerald. The Affidavit was the subject of a Motion to Strike 
before the District Court. Appellants did not submit a response 
to the Motion to Strike. (Documents 84, 85). 
22. In response to the District Court's Order to submit an 
additional memorandum and evidence regarding the defamation plus 
claim, the Fitzgeralds submitted a document entitled 
"Supplementation of the Record" which consisted of a two para-
graph affidavit from the Leland Fitzgeralds together with copies 
of various uniform real estate contracts. Utah County moved to 
strike the affidavit because it did not comply with Rule 56, 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and otherwise contained matters 
which were inadmissable. (Documents 92 through 96). 
23. The lawsuit filed by Utah County against the 
Fitzgeralds in the Fourth District Court for the State of Utah 
was dismissed pursuant to a Stipulation and Agreement signed by 
both parties. The Stipulation and Agreement specifically recited 
that filing of the Stipulation and Order dismissing the Complaint 
would not act as a waiver or release of any of the defenses of 
Utah County for any of the causes of action alleged in the 
Fitzgeralds' lawsuit in the United States District Court for 
Utah. (Appellants' Addendum, L). 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANTS' FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS 
FAIL AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
A, The Applicable Statutes and Ordinances in Question are 
a Constitutionally Valid Exercise of the Police Power. 
The Fitzgeralds allege that Utah County Ordinance § 4-3-53 
(Addendum K, Appellants' Addendum) is an unconstitutional exer-
cise of the County's police power because it prohibits the sale 
of land without County approval. This allegation is false both 
as a matter of fact and as the ordinance was applied by Utah 
County officials. 
The ordinance in question merely requires that an owner of 
property who sells land without first recording a subdivision 
plat, as required by State statute and County ordinance, obtain a 
waiver from the plat filing requirement from the County. The 
waiver will be granted if the owner and buyer of property record 
satisfactory deed covenants which insure that the property will, 
in fact, be used for the purposes which allow exemption from the 
plat filing requirement, i.e., bona fide agricultural, commer-
cial, manufacturing and industrial use. 
The purpose for this covenant requirement is to guarantee 
that buyers and sellers of property understand the zoning limita-
tions affecting the property. Utah County decided that the 
-7-
covenant requirement was a reasonable method to enforce zoning 
decisions of the County and to notify buyers of property that use 
of the land may be restricted, despite "marketing11 representa-
tions made by sellers. Discovery in this case reveals that the 
Fitzgeralds sold large tracts of land to buyers knowing that the 
buyers planned to further divide the purchased property for sale 
as residential property, not agricultural land as it was zoned. 
Utah County's ordinance was reasonable and was a rational 
method to accomplish a legitimate governmental purpose. It is 
axiomatic that all presumptions favor the validity and reason-
ableness of zoning ordinances and regulations adopted by local 
government authorities. The burden is clearly upon the party 
seeking judicial relief from such government action to establish 
that the ordinance in question does not permit any possible 
interpretation that would justify its adoption; or that the 
action of the local zoning authority is arbitrary or capricious, 
having no substantial relationship to promoting the safety, 
order, prosperity and general welfare of the community. South 
Gwinnett Venture v. Pruitt, 491 F.2d 5, 7 (5th Cir. 1974), Cert 
denied, 419 U.S. 837 (1974); 101A, C.J.S., Zoning and Land 
Planning, § § 310 - 311. 
It has long been recognized that considerable flexibility 
should be afforded and maxim deference should be given to local 
zoning authorities in confronting emerging land use issues. 
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Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Company, 272 U.S. 365 (1926); 
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). 
Utah County has an obvious and legitimate interest in pro-
moting orderly growth and providing public services to the unin-
corporated areas of the County through the process of requiring 
the filing of subdivision plats. The County has been granted 
that authority through applicable State enabling legislation, 
Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-1 et. seq. (1953, as amended). In addi-
tion, Utah County has an interest, rationally related to a legi-
timate public purpose, in protecting the use of land for agricul-
tural purposes in rural, unincorporated areas of the County, 
which is also recognized in the enabling legislation in question. 
The District Court agreed that the ordinance was a valid 
exercise of the police power. The District Court also found that 
the Fitzgeralds1 interpretation of the State enabling legislation 
was in error: 
. . • The court notes that plaintiffs 
[appellants] claim that Utah Code Annotated § 
17-27-27 precludes counties from interfering 
with the right to sell properties under the 
enumerated exceptions . . . However, the 
applicable ordinances do not preclude sub-
division of agricultural land for agricul-
tural purposes. Rather, they merely insure 
by requiring covenants be filed that land 
exempted from the subdivision requirements in 
§ 17-27-27 shall not be utilized for any 
purpose that would otherwise require the 
filing of a subdivision plat. These ordi-
nances impose reasonable regulations not 
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inconsistent with [the statute], well within 
the County's authority• 
(Memorandum Decision September 7, 1988# page 4). 
The District Court further found that the ordinances were 
constitutionally enacted pursuant to valid, police power author-
ity. The ordinances obviously related to zoning and planning 
functions of the County by promoting controlled growth and insur-
ing that lands used for one purpose were not "tunneled" into 
another purpose through the exemption from subdivision plat 
filing requirements. The Court recognized that zoning decisions 
are a legislative function and courts should avoid substituting 
their judgments for that of the legislative body of a municipal-
ity , Crest View-Holladay Homeowners' Association, Inc. v. Engh 
Floral Company, 454 P.2d 1150, 1152 (Utah 1976). 
Contrary to the Fitzgeralds' assertions, the ordinance did 
not invest County officials with unconstitutional authority. The 
Fitzgeralds complained of "difficulty" in complying with the 
ordinance. This "difficulty" was no doubt occasioned because 
buyers and sellers of the property became aware, through the 
ordinance, that the property in Cedar Valley was restricted to 
agricultural use, inconsistent with the "marketing" which 
accompanied many of the sales. The ordinance was neither vague 
nor arbitrary and as the District Court found "the ordinances 
. . . sufficiently spell out what is required of a subdivider. 
Persons of common sense and understanding would not have to guess 
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at the meaning of the ordinances," (Memorandum Decision, 
September 7, 1988, page 7), 
B. The Ordinances Were Constitutionally Applied. 
The Fitzgeralds contend that enforcement of Utah County 
Ordinance 4-3-53 was unconstitutional because it violated their 
rights to procedural due process. Utah County submits that the 
procedural due process claim is without merit for at least two 
reasons. First, the Fitzgeralds did not have any property inter-
est protected by the federal constitution which was affected by 
application of the ordinance. Second, the Fitzgeralds1 claims 
are not ripe because they failed to pursue available adminis-
trative remedies. 
Regarding the first defect in the Fitzgeralds1 position, 
they complain that they enjoyed an unfettered right to receive a 
waiver or exemption from the normal subdivision plat filing 
requirement. However, they point to no legal authority recogniz-
ing that an expectation of receiving an exemption or waiver from 
normal requirements constitutes a protected property interest. 
Hope of obtaining a waiver is not an entitlement, but rather 
rests with the discretion of government officials. Even if Utah 
County officials violated the ordinance in its application, 
(which Utah County denies) such a violation does not implicate 
the federal constitution. 
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It has long been recognized that § 1983 imposes liability 
only for violations of rights protected by the constitution, not 
simply for all claims which may be cognizable under state tort, 
statutory or contract law. To do otherwise would make the Civil 
Rights Act a "font of tort law to be superimposed upon whatever 
system may already be administered by the states," Paul v. Davis, 
424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976). Every act by a state official does not 
necessarily rise to constitutional dimensions, Baker v. McCollan, 
443 U.S. 137 (1979). Furthermore, violations of state statutes 
or municipal ordinances do not necessarily create a cause of 
action under § 1983, nor do they necessarily state a violation of 
the due process clause. Kompare v. Stein, 801 F.2d 883 (7th Cir. 
1986). 
The existence of a state created procedure which provides a 
remedy for one who challenges the enforcement of a statute or 
ordinance is one factor to be considered in deciding whether the 
appellants' "interest" is protected by the Federal Constitution. 
Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981); Boston Environmental 
Sanitation Inspectors Association v. Boston, 794 F.2d 12 (1st 
Cir. 1986). Spence v. Zimmerman, 873 F.2d 256, 261 (11th Cir. 
1989) ("Ordinance enforcement . . . is not the stuff of which 
constitutional violations are made"); Burrell v. City of 
Kankakee, 815 F.2d 1127, 1129 (7th Cir. 1987); Creative 
Environments, Inc. v. Estabrook, 680 F.2d 822, 833 (1st Cir. 
1982) . 
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As to the second defect in the Fitzgeralds' due process 
claim, Utah County contends that the Fitzgeralds have not suf-
fered a due process violation because an adequate state remedy 
was available which provided redress for the specific grievance 
of which the Fitzgeralds complain. However, the Fitzgeralds made 
no attempt to obtain relief through administrative procedures and 
therefore the extent of the government's action was never deter-
mined, despite the existence of an opportunity to receive 
procedural due process. 
The concepts of finality and adequacy of state remedies in 
the context of a § 1983 claim were first enunciated in Parratt v. 
Taylor, supra, where the Court identified one of the critical 
elements of a valid Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claims as 
"including only those deprivations which occur, without due 
process of law." The Parratt Court extensively evaluated what 
pre- and post-deprivation remedies may be available to an 
aggrieved party under applicable state law and adopted the fol-
lowing approach: 
We may reasonably conclude, therefore, that 
the existence of an adequate state remedy to 
redress property damage inflicted by state 
officers avoided the conclusion that there 
has been any constitutional deprivation of 
property without due process of law within 
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. 451 
U.S. at 542 (citing Bonner v. Couqhlin, 417 
F.2d 1311, 1319 (7th Cir. 1975)). 
Such analysis has been refined by later decisions and was 
particularly emphasized in Williamson Regional Planning 
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Commission v. Hamilton Bank, 105 Sup.Ct. 3108 (1985). There, the 
Court made reference to Parratt and concluded that constitutional 
guarantees may be adequately satisfied by a state's provision of 
a meaningful post-deprivation process. The Court held that state 
action may not be "complete" in the sense of causing a constitu-
tional injury, unless or until the state fails to provide an 
adequate post-deprivation remedy. Id. at 3121. See also 
McDonald, Summer and Frates v. County of Yolo, 106 Sup.Ct. 2561 
(1986). 
This court has addressed a similar claim very recently in 
Landmark Land Company of Oklahoma/ Inc. v. Buchanan, 874 F.2d 717 
(10th cir. 1989). In Landmark a developer brought a cause of 
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming that officials of Del 
City, Oklahoma violated procedural due process by failing to 
issue certain building permits and that the failure to do so 
resulted in financial losses to the developer. This Court found 
that assuming the developer (Landmark) had a federally protected 
property interest in the permits, the City could not withhold 
them without affording due process. The Court noted that the 
developer had a property interest only to the extent to which 
Oklahoma law or local ordinance gave it a "legitimate claim of 
entitlement" as opposed to a mere "unilateral expectation." 
(Quoting Littlefield v. City of Afton, 75 F.2d 596, 599-603 (8th 
Cir. 1986)). The Court then held that consideration of the 
extent of the property interest was not necessary since Landmark 
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had received all of the process due by appearance before the Del 
City Board of Adjustment. The Court also found the developer's 
taking and substantive due process claims were not ripe for 
federal review because the City's actions had not reached suffi-
cient finality regarding the property in question. 
In the instant case, the Fitzgeralds, unlike the developer 
in Landmark, made no application of any kind to the Utah County 
Board of Adjustment for review of the decisions of the zoning 
officials concerning any alleged errors of interpretation 
reportedly made regarding the validity of the waiver of sub-
division plat filing requirements which the Fitzgeralds attempted 
to obtain. In the context of possible deprivation of constitu-
tional rights, the Fitzgeralds suffered no due process violation 
because they blatantly failed to take advantage of administrative 
and judicial relief which was available to them. If the 
Fitzgeralds were dissatisfied with the decisions of zoning offi-
cials, they had an opportunity to appear before the Utah County 
Board of Adjustment, Utah County Ordinance for § 4-7-13. The 
Board had the power to 
11
. . . Hear and decide appeals concern-
ing errors of interpretation reportedly made 
by a zoning administrator." 
The Fitzgeralds claim that they do not allege errors of 
interpretation by zoning administrators; but that allegation is 
simply not tenable. Disagreements about waivers from the sub-
division plat filing requirement and the sufficiency of 
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restrictive covenants could have been heard and decided by the 
Board of Adjustments, The Fitzgeralds never made an appearance 
before the Board of Adjustment nor did they petition to the Board 
for review of their disagreements with zoning officials. As this 
court noted in Landmark Land Company, "[a]s long as Landmark had 
'the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a mean-
ingful manner,1 the 'fundamental requirement of due process' is 
satisfied." Landmark at 723-724. 
The Fitzgeralds also could have obtained judicial review of 
an adverse decision by the Board of Adjustments. The Fitzgeralds 
allege that judicial review was impossible because the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act, 63-30-1, et.. seq. . Utah Code Ann. 
(1953, as amended) creates immunity from damages for certain of 
the allegations in the Fitzgeralds' Complaint. Reference to the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act does not cure the defects in the 
Fitzgeralds' position, however. Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-15 (1953, 
as amended) provides explicit authority for Utah Courts to review 
complaints of any person aggrieved by a decision of the Board of 
Adjustment. The statute also provides that such a person may 
maintain a plenary action for relief. Again, the invalidity of 
the Fitzgeralds' position is clear: they could have petitioned 
the Board of Adjustment for review of zoning officials' 
decisions, they did not do so. If the decision of the Board of 
Adjustment were adverse, the Fitzgeralds could have obtained 
judicial review of the Board of Adjustment's decision. The 
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Fitzgeralds failed to avail themselves of these explicit remedies 
and consequently their due process claim was dismissed. 
The Fitzgeralds complain that the actions of Utah County 
officials were intended to interfere with the Fitzgeralds' right 
to alienate their property and further frustrated their dream of 
developing a rural, agricultural community in Cedar Valley. In 
this respect, the Fitzgeralds are much like the real estate 
developer in Creative Environments, Inc. v. Estabrook, 680 F.2d 
822, 833 (1st Cir. 1982). The developer in Creative 
Environments, Inc. submitted a subdivision plan which was 
rejected by the town's planning board. The developer then 
asserted a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that the town's officials 
violated the developer's due process and equal protection rights 
by "distorting" and misapplying statutory and regulatory develop-
ment laws, 680 F.2d at 831. Further, the defendants [Planning 
Board] allegedly interpreted the laws "in ways which frustrated 
plaintiffs'" project. Id. at 833. 
While recognizing that "it is not impossible to derive a 
theoretical basis for [plaintiffs'] arguments," the First Circuit 
affirmed defendants' summary judgment, holding that such claims 
are: 
[T]oo typical of the run of the mill dispute 
between a developer and a town planning 
agency, regardless of [plaintiffs'] charac-
terizations of it and of defendants' alleged 
mental states . . . Every appeal by a 
disappointed developer from an adverse ruling 
by a local . . . planning board necessarily 
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involves some claim that the board exceeded, 
abused, or "distorted" its legal authority in 
some manner, often for some perverse (from 
the developer's point of view) reason. It is 
not enough simply to give these state law 
claims constitutional labels such as "due 
process" or "equal protection" in order to 
raise a substantial federal questions under § 
1983. 
Id. at 833 (emphasis in original). 
In elaboration, the court stated that the federal constitu-
tion is not invoked "simply because a local planning board . . . 
makes demands which arguably exceed its authority under the 
relevant state statutes." id. at 832 n.9. "§ 1983 is not a 
means of litigating the correctness of . . . state or local 
administrative decision." Jd. "Were such a theory to be 
accepted, any hope of maintaining a meaningful separation between 
federal and state jurisdiction in this and many other areas of 
law would be jettisoned." Id. at 831. 
C. Plaintiffs Claims For Taking of Their Property Should 
be Dismissed. 
Landmark Land Company of Oklahoma, Inc. v. Buchanan, 874 
F.2d 717 (10th Cir. 1989) also disposes of appellants' taking 
claim. In Landmark the court found that in order to assert a 
taking claim under § 1983 and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
"the government entity charged with implementing the regulations 
[must have] . . . reached a final decision regarding the 
application of the regulations to the property at issue." Citing 
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Williamson Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank, 473 
U.S. 172, 105 Sup.Ct. 3108 (1985). The court also noted, "[a] 
'final decision' requires not only an initial rejection of par-
ticular development proposal, but a definitive action by local 
authorities indicating with some specificity what level of devel-
opment will be permitted on the property in question." 874 F.2d 
at 720. 
The Fitzgeralds cannot even allege that they attempted to 
obtain a final decision from Utah County or that the County ever 
decided with specificity what limitations, if any, would apply to 
the Fitzgeralds* sale of their property. The Fitzgeralds failed 
to make any application to the Board of Adjustment regarding 
decisions of Utah County zoning officials. Therefore under 
Landmark and Williamson County, the Fitzgeralds* claim for a 
taking lacks ripeness and finality and must be dismissed. 
Moreover, the Fitzgeralds cannot show and failed to present 
any evidence before the District Court that they were denied all 
viable uses of their property. The District Court recognized the 
weakness of the Fitzgeralds' taking claim. The District Court 
found that, "[t]he Supreme Court in emphasizing the character of 
the governmental action [has said that] land use regulation does 
not effect a taking if it 'substantially advance[s] legitimate 
state interests and does not 'does not den[y] an owner economi-
cally viable use of his land.'11 Citing Nolan v. California 
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Coastal Commission, 107 Sup.Ct. 3141 (1987) (quoting Aqins v. 
Tiburon/ 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)). 
The District Court's decision is entirely consistent with 
this court's decision in Landmark. This Court said, "[i]f Del 
City den[ies] [Landmark] 'all use of its property for a con-
siderable period,' Landmark will have a claim for temporary 
taking under the Supreme Court's recent holding in First English 
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles." Id. at 
721. The Fitzgeralds have not been denied all use of their 
property, even for a temporary period. First, the Fitzgeralds 
could comply with the plat requirements and develop the land 
through that process. Second, the Fitzgeralds could alienate the 
land or develop it for agricultural purposes without subdividing. 
Third, the Fitzgeralds have not shown that they cannot possible 
comply with the restrictive covenants requirements. Fourth, the 
Board of Adjustment could afford some relief. 
Landmark also addresses the Fitzgeralds' claim of frustrated 
sales: 
"It is true that the delays entailed in this 
requirement [finality of government action] 
might result in certain injuries to land-
owners. Indeed, Landmark alleges it lost two 
sales because of the regulatory cloud over 
its head. However, "[m]ere fluctuations in 
value during the process of governmental 
decision making, absent extraordinary delay, 
are 'incidents of ownership'" citing Agins v. 
City Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 263 n.9. 
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The Fitzgeralds' taking claim is not ripe because there has 
been no finality of Utah County's decision and it is therefore 
impossible to determine what affect, if any, the County's exer-
cise of its police power had on the Fitzgeralds' property. 
Moreover, the Fitzgeralds failed to demonstrate that Utah 
County's actions denied them all economically viable uses of 
their property. Consequently, the Fitzgeralds' taking claim must 
be dismissed and the decision of the District Court affirmed. 
D. Plaintiffs Have Failed to Establish a Viable Claim for 
Alleged Defamation Plus Constitutional Injury. 
The District Court in its September 7, 1988 Memorandum 
Decision granted appellees' Motion for Summary Judgment on all 
issues except the claim of defamation plus constitutional injury. 
The Court instructed the parties to provide addition briefing and 
evidence on this issue. The Fitzgeralds submitted a two para-
graph affidavit together with copies of various uniform real 
estate contracts in response to the Court's instruction. The 
District Court reviewed this "supplementation of the record" and 
issued a second Memorandum Decision dismissing the defamation 
plus constitutional injury claim. The Fitzgeralds' defamation 
plus constitutional injury claim is defective and was properly 
dismissed for two reasons. First, the Fitzgeralds have failed to 
prove any defamatory statements were made, despite abundant 
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opportunity to do so and second, there is no separate constitu-
tional injury related to the alleged defamation. 
The Fitzgeralds, in conclusory fashion, assert that various 
County officials made statements which harmed the Fitzgeralds' 
business interests. The Fitzgeralds further claim that the 
filing of a lis pendens constituted a slander of title sufficient 
to establish their defamation claim. There was no evidence 
presented to the District Court of any statements made by Utah 
County officials and the lis pendens was dismissed by stipulation 
and agreement of the parties based on the Fitzgeralds1 willing-
ness to comply with Utah County ordinances. Furthermore, the 
Fitzgeralds presented no evidence that any business relationships 
or contractual agreements were interfered with or breached be-
cause of any statements by County officials or the filing of the 
lis pendens. 
In a similar case, the United States District Court of 
Colorado in Walters v. Linhof, 559 F.Sup. 1231, 1234 (D. Colo. 
1983) granted defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. In 
Walters, land developers had brought a defamation action based 
upon allegedly defamatory statements contained in letters by 
various defendants to county land use departments, county offi-
cials and to the editor of a local newspaper. The Court, in 
dismissing these claims, stated: 
The statements do no injury to the reputation 
or the character of the plaintiffs. I recog-
nize that in the area of politics these 
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statements may contribute to a decision which 
is adverse to plaintiffs plans for the con-
struction# but economic advantage is not the 
legal equivalent of reputation. In fact, 
public hearings and free and open communi-
cation by citizens with public agencies and 
public officials give the First Amendment its 
raison d'etre. (Emphasis added.) 
Any statements or representations made by Utah County 
regarding appellants land were done in the proper discharge of 
their official duty. Appellees have the obligation to place 
actual or prospective purchasers on notice of any potential 
limitations with respect to the use of their property. This type 
of communication is not considered libelous or slanderous and is 
privileged under Utah Law. Utah Code Ann. § 45-2-3 (1953 as 
amended). In Walters, supra, the Court stated: 
Proceedings for rezoning and development of a 
project the size of that proposed by plain-
tiffs falls within the 'interest of social 
importance1 category. Additionally, state-
ments made during judicial proceedings are 
absolutely immune. Proceedings of boards and 
commissioners that are judicial or quasi 
judicial in nature are protected. To hold 
otherwise would chill First Amendment rights 
to express an opinion and publicly comment on 
judicial or quasi judicial proceedings. Even 
if not absolutely privileged, the statements 
would most likely be qualifiedly or condi-
tionally privileged. 
559 F.Supp. at 1237. 
Accordingly, if statements and representations were made by 
Utah County to prospective purchasers about the zoning require-
ments in Cedar Valley, they were not defamatory as a matter of 
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law. In the alternative, any such statements or representations 
are privileged communications. 
Finally, in order for the alleged defamation to be action-
able, the Fitzgeralds must show it was the direct result of 
actual malice. Direct Import Buyers Association v. KSL, Inc., 
572 P.2d 692, 696 (Utah 1977). Although the Fitzgeralds have 
alleged that certain statements and representations were false, 
and that these statements and representations damaged their 
business and personal reputations, they have failed to plead or 
allege any actual malice on the part of Utah County. Utah County 
submits that there was no showing of defamatory statements and 
appellants have failed to satisfy this prong of the defamation 
plus constitutional injury claim. 
Assuming, however, that the Fitzgeralds could establish the 
elements of a pendent state law claim for defamation, their 
defamation "plus" constitutional injury claim is still defective. 
The District Court's decision on this issue is very relevant. 
The District Court acknowledged that defamation, standing alone, 
cannot be the basis for an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Paul 
v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976). The Court further found that 
in order to "succeed under § 1983, a plaintiff whose reputation 
has been injured by the remarks of a public official must also 
show that he has suffered an additional "tangible" injury, such 
as loss of employment as a result of the defamation. See also 
Corbitt v. Andersen, 778 F.2d 1471, 1474 to 1475 (10th Cir. 
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1985). The District Court then analyzed whether the alleged 
injury suffered by the Fitzgeralds, i.e., the slowdown in sales 
of property to new buyers and the failure of previous buyers to 
make contract payments, is a sufficient "tangible" injury to 
constitute infringement of a liberty or property interest 
protected by the federal constitution. 
The District Court held that tangible injury must be 
inflicted by the government directly, apart from the consequences 
flowing from an injury to reputation because of the independent 
actions of third parties. This decision is consistent with 
several decisions of the United States Supreme Court as well as 
other Circuit Courts of Appeal. In Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 
(1976) the Court stated: 
We have noted the 'constitutional shoals' 
that confront any attempt to derive from 
congressional civil rights statutes a body of 
general federal tort law; (citations 
omitted); a fortiori, the procedural guaran-
tees of the Due Process Clause cannot be the 
source for such law . . . [W]e think that the 
weight of our decisions establishes no con-
stitutional doctrine converting every defama-
tion by a public official into a deprivation 
of liberty within the meaning of the due 
process clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
The United States Supreme Court in Board of Regents v. Roth, 
408 U.S. 564 (1972) likewise refused to extend the due process 
clause to include the type of claim made by the Fitzgeralds here. 
The United States Supreme Court held: 
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It was this alteration [alteration or extin-
guishment of a right or status previously 
recognized by state law], officially removing 
the interest from the recognition and protec-
tion previously afforded by the state, which 
we found sufficient to invoke the procedural 
guarantees contained in the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The 
interest in reputation alone which respondent 
seeks to vindicate in this action in federal 
court is quite different from the "liberty" 
or "property" recognized in those decisions. 
Kentucky law does extend to respondent any 
legal guarantees of present enjoyment of 
reputation which has been altered as a result 
of petitioners' actions. Rather his interest 
in reputation is simply one of number which 
the state may protect against injury by vir-
tue of its tort law, providing a forum for 
vindication of those interests by means of 
damages actions. And any harm or injury to 
that interest, even where as here inflicted 
by an officer of the State, does not result 
in the deprivation of any "liberty" or 
"property" recognized by state or federal 
law, nor has it worked any change of respon-
dent's status as theretofore recognized under 
the state's laws. For these reasons, we hold 
that the interest and reputation asserted in 
this case is neither "liberty" nor "property" 
guaranteed against state deprivation without 
due process of law. 
The District Court noted that a few Courts have interpreted 
Paul v. Davis differently, but the Court nevertheless found that 
to establish defamation plus constitutional injury, defamation by 
a state actor must involve some "tangible change of status vis a 
vis the government." Doe v. United States Department of Justice, 
753 F.2d 1092, 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1985). The Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals in Havis v. Thorton, 609 F.2d 372 (9th Cir. 1979) 
affirmed the dismissal of a § 1983 action where the plaintiffs 
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alleged that due to the governments defamation they lost large 
sums of money. The Ninth Circuit found that Paul v. Davis must 
be read in the context of government employment cases which 
involve situations where a right or status previously recognized 
by state law was distinctly altered or extinguished. Havis at 
375. 
The D.C. Circuit in Doe interpreted Paul v. Davis in similar 
fashion, stating: 
This Circuit . . . has consistently inter-
preted Paul's "stigma plus" test to require 
two forms of government action before a 
plaintiff can "transform a [common law] defa-
mation into a [constitutional] deprivation of 
liberty . . . " First, the government must be 
the source of the defamatory allegations 
. . . Second, the resulting "stigma" must 
involve some tangible change of status vis a 
vis the government. 
Id. at 1108-1109. 
The analysis in Doe requires defamation plus an injury 
directly caused by the government as opposed to "injury caused by 
the actions of some third party acting upon the public official's 
defamatory remarks." Dower v. Dickinson, 700 F.Supp. 640, 646 to 
47 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). 
This Court's decision in Corbitt v. Anderson, 778 F.2d 1471 
(10th Circ. 1985) is not inconsistent with such an analysis. 
Corbitt bases its "tangible" injury analysis on the fact that the 
defendant interfered with the plaintiff's right to pursue govern-
ment contracts and future employment opportunities, indicating 
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that tangible injury requires some change in a party's status vis 
a vis the government, rather than injury caused by the acts of 
third parties based upon public officials1 allegedly defamatory 
remarks. 
The First Circuit in Creative Environments. Inc. v. 
Estabrook, 680 F.2d 822 (1st Cir. 1981), cert denied 459 U.S- 989 
(1982) held that: 
Property is not denied without due process 
simply because a local planning board rejects 
a proposed development for erroneous reasons 
or makes demands which arguably exceed its 
authority under relevant state statutes. 
See also Culebra Enterprises Corp. v. Rio, 613 F.Supp. 146 
2(D.P.R. 1985), vacated on other grounds, 622 F.Supp. 128 (D.P.R. 
1985) (the right to property or entitlement does not include the 
right to develop land). 
The Fitzgeralds1 status vis a vis Utah County is unaltered 
and no property or liberty interest previously protected by the 
State or the County has been extinguished by Utah County's 
actions. The Fitzgeralds are absolutely free to alienate their 
property and this was true before and after the alleged defama-
tory remarks. The Fitzgeralds further claim that their property 
was more difficult to sell after the alleged defamatory remarks. 
However, this type of injury, even if supported by the evidence, 
flows from the decisions of private, nongovernmental actors, 
which injuries do not constitute a governmental deprivation of 
liberty or property without due process in violation of the 
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Constitution• Furthermore, the Fitzgeralds may resort to state 
courts for a remedy to the alleged defamation. The District 
Court found, " [i]t was the decisions of non-governmental third 
parties, the purchasers and potential purchasers, coupled with 
plaintiffs' own failure to comply with the 1976 revised zoning 
ordinance which caused the injuries alleged by plaintiffs." See 
Rice v. Vigil, 642 F.Supp. 212, 215 (D.N.M. 1986); Sullivan v. 
New Jersey, Division of Gaming Enforcement 602 F.Supp. 1216, 
1220 (D.N.J. 1985). 
The District Court also found that even if a "tangible" 
injury had been shown, the Fitzgeralds failed to show that a 
genuine issue of fact existed as to whether the alleged depriva-
tion occurred without due process. The District Court's analysis 
indicated that while a pre-deprivation procedure may not have 
been practical, post-deprivation remedies including state court 
actions for defamation, slander of title, interference with 
business relations and interference with contractual relations 
could have been pursued. The Fitzgeralds failed to avail them-
selves of any of these possible remedies. Consequently, the 
Fitzgeralds totally failed to prove their defamation plus con-
stitutional injury claim and the District Court, after careful 
review, properly dismissed it. 
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POINT II 
APPELLANTS' CLAIMS FOR MALICIOUS PROSECUTION 
AND IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACT MUST BE DISMISSED. 
The Fitzgeralds do not address their impairment of contract 
or malicious prosecution claims in their brief. The District 
Court noted in its September 7, 1988 decision that the common law 
tort of malicious prosecution does not create a federal constitu-
tional claim under § 1983/ citing Friedman v. Skokie, 763 F.2d 
236, 239 (7th Cir. 1985) (citing Lvnlev v. Amoco Production 
Company, 639 F.2d 671, 673 (10th Cir. 1981)). The Court also 
found that the essential elements of a malicious prosecution were 
absent in the Fitzgeralds' case. 
The Court further observed in its July 25, 1989 decision 
that the Fitzgeralds apparently conceded that their impairment of 
contracts claim under 1983 should be dismissed, citing Poirier v. 
Hodges, 445 F.Supp. 838, 842-43 (M.D. Flor. 1978). Utah County 
merely notes that these issues have not been raised to this Court 
and the District Court's decision granting Utah County's Motion 
for Summary Judgment should be affirmed. 
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POINT III 
ALL INDIVIDUALLY NAMED DEFENDANTS ARE 
ENTITLED TO IMMUNITY AS A MATTER OF LAW, 
A. Defendant Lynn Davis is Absolutely Immune From 
Liability Under § 1983 for Actions in His Role as a Deputy Utah 
County Attorney. 
Even when viewed in a light most favorable to the 
Fitzgeralds, their Complaint clearly demonstrates that all ac-
tions attributable defendant Davis were undertaken in his capa-
city as Deputy County Attorney, bringing him within the scope of 
the absolute immunity recognized in Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 
409 (1976). The importance of allowing a public prosecutor to 
discharge his responsibilities without fear of the possible 
consequence of exceeding his jurisdiction in the initiation and 
presentation of the case was reaffirmed in Lerwill v. Joslin, 712 
F.2d 435 (10th Cir. 1983) . 
B. All Other Individual Defendants Acted in an Objectively 
Reasonable Manner and Are Entitled to Qualified Immunity. 
The United States Supreme Court in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 
U.S. 800 (1982), recognized the fact that local officials would 
inevitably be subjected to the aggravation and expense of trial 
where they performed discretionary functions and did not violate 
clearly established constitutional rights because of their 
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inability to prove subjective good faith as a matter of law. The 
Court held: 
We conclude the bare allegations of malice 
should not suffice to subject governmental 
officials either to the cause of trial or to 
the burdens of broad-reaching discovery. We 
therefore hold that government officials 
performing discretionary functions generally 
are shielded from liability for civil damages 
insofar as their conduct does not violate 
clearly established statutory or constitu-
tional rights of which a reasonable person 
would have known. 
Id. at 410. 
Under Harlow, Id. and Anderson v. Creiqhton, 107 Sup.Ct. 
3034 (1987) the individual appellees are entitled to qualified 
immunity. 
Utah County was likewise entitled to summary judgment and 
that decision should be affirmed. The Fitzgeralds failed to 
present any evidence showing that actions or statements by non-
policy makers were illegal or made pursuant to an official cus-
tom, policy or practice. Rather, the District Court found that 
statements and actions, if they occurred, were random, unauth-
orized statements made by employees of Utah County. 
CONCLUSION 
The Fitzgeralds characterize this case as one involving Utah 
County's intentional efforts to improperly control and prohibit 
the sale and use of the Fitzgeralds' property. This charac-
terization is not correct and ignores fundamental legal 
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principles regarding the appropriate exercise of the police power 
by Utah County. The Fitzgeralds failed to take advantage of 
available administrative remedies to resolve disagreements about 
interpretation of county ordinances. Consequently, many of the 
Fitzgeralds' claims are not ripe for decision by this Court. 
Other claims, specifically the defamation plus constitutional 
injury claim, fail because the Fitzgeralds did not suffer a 
"tangible" injury protected by the federal constitution. The 
Fitzgeralds allege, but offer no evidence, that third parties 
acted or failed to act in response to Utah County's decisions. 
However, the conduct of third parties, under these circumstances, 
does not implicate constitutional protections. Finally, indi-
vidual appellees are entitled to qualified immunity or absolute 
immunity and Utah County was entitled to summary judgment because 
no action of an individual appellee was the result of a County 
policy, practice or custom. 
The Fitzgeralds had significant opportunity to present to 
evidence to the District Court regarding all of their claims, 
particularly the defamation plus constitutional injury claim. 
This case was filed in 1982 and the Fitzgeralds had several years 
to gather and marshall evidence. Their only evidence, however, 
was conclusory affidavits which were improper under Rule 56, 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and otherwise failed to present 
admissable evidence as required by Rule 56 and Celotex v. 
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). Therefore, the District Court's 
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decision granting appellees1 Motion for Summary Judgment should 
be affirmed by this Court. 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
Appellees, Utah County, Jeff Mendenhall, Gordon Buckley 
Rose, Iva Snell, Keith Richan, Jeril Wilson and Lynn Davis hereby 
request oral argument. 
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